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COMMENTS ON WILLIAM A. NISKANEN'S
ON WISCONSIN: SOME FRIENDLY
CONSTITUTIONAL AD VICE
ANDREW RESCHOVSKY*
It is indeed an honor to be asked to comment on Dr. Niskanen's
paper.1 Bill Niskanen has had an illustrious career; he is a longtime
student of government and has made insightful contributions to the
literature on public decision making. The paper Bill presented today is
interesting and provocative, and I encourage you to read it.
Although the paper covers a number of issues, I would like to focus
these comments directly on Niskanen's five proposed constitutional
amendments. I'll first ask whether each proposal is good public policy.
If I conclude that the proposal represents sensible policy, I'll then ask
whether it should be enacted as a statute or enshrined in the state's
constitution.
I.
Niskanen's first proposal is that "State general expenditures in any
fiscal year may not exceed one hundred and [some] percent of the state
general revenues in the second prior fiscal year without the approval of a
majority of those elected to each house of the legislature.",2 He suggests
that a reasonable target growth rate for state spending would be the
growth rate of personal income within the state. There is no question
that in making tax and spending policies, the legislature should pay
attention to the growth rate of the economy. In fact, even without this
rule, state and local government spending hasn't grown much faster than
personal income growth. It's only three percentage points higher today
than in 1970, a modest increase considering the rapid increase in the
costs of providing public services, in particular health care.
Niskanen points out that linking spending to revenue from two years
* Professor of Public Affairs and Applied Economics, Robert M. La Follette School of
Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. William A. Niskanen, On Wisconsin: Some Friendly Constitutional Advice, 90 MARQ.
L. REV. 701 (2007).
2. Id. (emphasis added).
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ago will help to stabilize state government spending. While the proposal
might prevent big spending cuts during a recession, implementation of
the spending limit might result in sharp cuts in spending a couple years
after a recession. If this amendment (or a statutory version) had been in
place over the past few years, the spending ceiling in 2004 would have
dropped by nearly 12% relative to its level in 2003, reflecting the impact
of the 2001 recession.3 Fortunately, the amendment gives the legislature
the power to override the spending limit. In fact, it provides the
legislature with the power it already has, namely the power to determine
the level and composition of state spending. I'm left to ask, why then do
we need this amendment?
II.
Niskanen's second proposal reads: "The rate or base of no state tax
may be increased without the approval by a majority of those voting in
the next election for members of the legislature."4 The first question one
might ask is why do we need such a policy when the current political
environment is so strongly supportive of keeping taxes low? In
Wisconsin, members of both major political parties are campaigning on
"no new taxes" platforms,5 and legislators in both parties strongly
supported a recently enacted property tax freeze.6 And more widely,
nearly half of all members of Congress, our President, and over 1300
state legislators around the country have signed a "no new taxes"
pledge.'
There are several reasons why, in my view, this proposal, even as a
statute, is bad tax policy. First, requiring votes on all tax rate or tax base
increases will make it very hard to ever reform the state tax system.
One example of a sensible reform is the Streamlined Sales Tax Project,
a national project to standardize across states the definitions of the sales
3. Information prepared by the author based on a simulation of Dr. Niskanen's proposal
included in Niskanen, supra note 1.
4. Niskanen, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., Jennie Tunkieicz, Election 2006: Incumbent, Challenger Both Favor Spending
Restraints; The Differences Are in the Details in 63rd Assembly District, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 2006, at 3B.
6. See Steven Walters, Doyle Tinkers with Property Tax Limits in Republican's Budget,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 24, 2005, at 1B (discussing Governor Doyle's vetoes of the
2005-2007 budget that altered, but did not remove, legislature-passed limits on local
government tax levy increases).
7. Eric Parker, State Lawmaker, Antitax Activist Debate Pledge to Oppose Tax Increases,
41 ST. TAX NOTES 543 (2006).
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tax base.8 Approval of the project recommendation by a large number
of states will make it easier for states to begin taxing mail order and
internet sales. Individual states would remain free to decide what to
include in their sales tax bases, but every state would define categories
of goods, for example, candy, in the same way. For Wisconsin,
accepting the standard definition of candy would mean, for example,
that marshmallows would become taxable. Other items that are now
taxable would be excluded from taxation. Although members of the
legislature can hold hearings on the proposal and debate its pros and
cons at length before coming to a decision, most voters won't have the
time to study the proposal in detail, and if they vote at all, may well be
swayed by vote-no ads from the marshmallow industry. Unfortunately,
there are no lobbyists for good tax policy. In my view, government will
operate both more effectively and be more in tune with the public
interest if decisions on complex fiscal issues are made by the legislature
rather than via referendum. I note that this point of view appears to be
shared by the panel of former governors who spoke last evening.9
Niskanen's tax proposal is non-symmetrical-all tax increases must
go to the voters, but a tax decrease, even if targeted to a narrow interest
group, say cranberry farmers, is not subject to approval by the voters.
Might the real motivation here be one of downsizing government?
There is ample empirical evidence that voters are much more likely
to support tax increases when the new revenues are dedicated to
support a particular public service that the public values. In states
where voters must approve tax increases, legislatures have frequently
proposed earmarked taxes. The revenue from these taxes can only be
used for specified purposes. The result is often a highly inflexible fiscal
system, where over time the state raises lots of revenue for things that
may no longer be top priorities, while it finds itself unable to raise
sufficient revenue to respond to current needs. A case in point is
Alabama, a state whose constitution contains over 700 amendments,
many of them dealing with fiscal matters, and as a result of these
amendments earmarks nearly 90% of total state revenue.1 ° As a result,
the state has almost no flexibility to deal with new priorities. Therein
lies a cautionary tale for Wisconsin.
8. Mary McLaughlin, The Streamlined Sales Tax Project, THE CPA J., Dec. 2003, at 58.
9. Former Governors Panel, Wisconsin Constitution Conference - Is the Wisconsin
Constitution Obsolete? (Oct. 5, 2006).
10. See ALA. CONST. amends. 1-777; see also Tom Baxter, Alabama Charts a New
Course, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 8, 2003, at B12 (noting that Alabama law earmarks about
92 cents of every dollar collected).
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III.
Niskanen's third proposed amendment attempts to prevent the state
government from imposing unfunded mandates on local governments.
The amendment says that "[t]he state must compensate local
governments for the estimated incremental cost of any new state mandate
on these governments. ,"
I want to argue that the proposal is likely to result in undesirable
outcomes. For example, because improperly treated sewage in one
municipality is likely to cause harm to the residents of all downriver
municipalities, it is perfectly reasonable for the state to set standards for
municipal sewage treatment. Requiring the state to pick up the entire
cost of meeting any new standards may not only lead the state to settle
for lower environmental standards, but it will also provide the polluting
local governments with a powerful incentive to under-maintain or delay
upgrading its own sewage system, knowing that the state will have to
pay for any mandated remediation.
Meanwhile, it is unlikely that the amendment would provide local
governments with much fiscal relief. Yes, the state will have to
compensate local governments for the costs of new mandates, but there
will be nothing to stop the state from, in effect, financing the costs of the
mandate by reducing other state aid to local governments, for example,
shared revenue or transportation aids. Finally, estimating the cost of
new mandates will undoubtedly lead to lots of litigation. Perhaps, we
might call this proposal the "Lawyers Full-Employment Amendment."
IV.
Niskanen's most far-reaching proposal would make any primary or
secondary school student in the state eligible for a voucher to attend a
private school. 2 The value of the voucher would be equal to the state
aid per student allocated to public schools in each student's home
district. The basic argument in favor of school vouchers is that the
competition among schools, both public and private, will increase the
productivity of all schools and will result in gains in overall student
achievement.
Niskanen justifies support for a universal school voucher
amendment based on his conclusion that the Milwaukee Parental
11. Niskanen, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
12. Id.
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Choice Program ("MPCP") has been an unqualified success. 3 The fact
is, the jury is still out on the effectiveness of the choice program. In his
paper, Niskanen cites two studies, one that concluded that the academic
performance of voucher students exceeded that of similar students
remaining in the Milwaukee public schools,'4 and the second that
claimed that students in public schools that had to compete with the
private voucher schools ended up improving their academic
performance more than similar students in Wisconsin schools that did
not face competition from private voucher schools. 5 These research
results led Niskanen to conclude that "almost every student was a
winner." 16
Although the statistical issues are quite complex, important
questions have been raised about the conclusions of both of these
studies by a number of other respected scholars. 7 In addition, other
studies of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, some of them more
recent, find little, if any improvement in the academic performance of
voucher students relative to Milwaukee public school students.' 8 I do
not mean to suggest that Milwaukee's Parental Choice Program has
been a complete failure. It seems quite clear that some students have
prospered in voucher schools. But, it is important to emphasize that the
evaluations are ongoing, and it is certainly too early to claim that the
voucher program is an unqualified success.
In some ways, the success of the Milwaukee voucher program is
beyond the point. In a slight of hand, Niskanen moved from
Milwaukee's program, a voucher program targeted to low-income
students, to a universal voucher program, one that would be available to
all students. 9 It is very important to note that there has been no direct
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Jay P. Greene et al., Effectiveness of School Choice: The Milwaukee
Experiment, 31 EDUC. & URBAN SOC'Y 190, 200 (1999)).
15. Id. (citing Caroline M. Hoxby, School Choice and School Productivity: Could School
Choice be a Tide that Lifts All Boats?, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 287, 323
(Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2003)).
16. Id.
17. See Helen F. Ladd, School Vouchers: A Critical View, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2002);
Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 113 Q.J. ECON. 553 (1998); Martin Carnoy et al., Does
Competition From Private Voucher Schools Improve Public School Performance?: A Case
Study of the Milwaukee Parents' Choice Program, 1996/1997-2004/2005 (April 2006)
(unpublished paper, on file with author).
18. See JOHN WrITE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
AMERICA'S FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM (1999); Carnoy, supra note 17.
19. Niskanen, supra note 1.
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research on universal voucher programs in the U.S., and research on the
long-standing universal voucher programs in Chile and New Zealand
calls into question the claim of voucher proponents that these programs
will result in increased student achievement.2" In fact, the international
evidence suggests that universal vouchers may well have worsened the
educational opportunities of low-income students.21
An unintended consequence of a universal voucher system may well
be the increased stratification of schools by students' socioeconomic
status and race. There exists considerable evidence that parents judge
schools by the characteristics of the other students in the school.22
Recent evidence has pointed to the important role a student's peers play
in his or her academic achievement.' As a result, with a universal
voucher system, disadvantaged students may well end up in schools with
heavy concentrations of other disadvantaged students. The chances that
disadvantaged students will end up concentrated in certain schools are
further increased if the value of vouchers does not reflect the extra
resources needed to educate many disadvantaged students, if voucher
schools are allowed to charge tuition or fees on top of the voucher, or if
voucher schools are free to choose which students to accept.
My point here is not to attack universal vouchers, but to argue that
the last thing we should do is to enshrine in our constitution an untested
policy, especially when the stakes-the education of our children-are
so high.
V.
Niskanen's final proposed constitutional amendment states that
"[n]othing in this constitution should be interpreted to imply that any
service financed by the state must necessarily be supplied by a state or
local government organization.
24
You may be surprised to hear that I agree with this statement 100%.
For many years, both the state and local governments in Wisconsin have
20. Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, The Uneven Playing Field of School Choice:
Evidence from New Zealand, 20 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 43 (2001); Patrick J. McEwan,
The Potential Impact of Large-Scale Voucher Programs, 70 REV. EDUC. RES. 103 (2000);
Patrick J. McEwan & Martin Carnoy, The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Private Schools in
Chile's Voucher System, 22 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 213 (2000).
21. See Ladd & Fiske, supra note 20; McEwan, supra note 20; McEwan & Carnoy; supra
note 20.
22. Ladd, supra note 17, at 6-7; McEwan, supra note 20.
23. Ladd, supra note 17, at 7; McEwan, supra note 20, at 130-134.
24. Niskanen, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
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been turning to the private sector to provide a wide range of services.
For example, private enterprise is involved in operating prisons,
counseling welfare clients, and maintaining police cars.2 In fact, as
Niskanen points out, Wisconsin provides a high level of public services
with a below average number of government employees. 26 As far as I
am aware, there is nothing in our constitution to prevent or discourage
governments in Wisconsin from using the private sector to provide
government financed services. So, it appears that what we have here is
an amendment in search of a problem.
VI.
Like many states, Wisconsin faces myriad fiscal challenges. In his
presentation, Bill Niskanen highlights a number of important fiscal
issues, such as taxation, school funding, and unfunded mandates. Let
me conclude by arguing that fiscal policy should be addressed by the
state legislature. Wisconsin should take the U.S. Constitution as a
model. One of the reasons that the U.S. Constitution has served us well
for over 200 years is that the framers had the wisdom to leave detailed
fiscal policy issues out of the Constitution. We would do well to follow
that model in Wisconsin.
25. See generally PAUL KENGORE, WIS. POLICY RESEARCH INST., COMPETITIVE
CONTRACTING AND PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS IN WISCONSIN STATE GOVERNMENT (2001).
26. Niskanen, supra note 1.
* * *
